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Comments
De Facto Public Officers in Louisiana
An individual may sometimes assume public office when
under the law he has no right or title to that office. As a matter
of protection to the public and other individuals who might presume, without a prohibitively thorough investigation of his status,
that he is that officer, the policy has evolved of giving legal status
to his acts under certain circumstances. This theory of de facto
officership is one that is well rooted, but still presents current
problems in certain ramifications and in discrepancies between
jurisdictions. Louisiana courts entertained the subject as early
as 1830,1 and in some eighty cases since that time. While the
situation had been greatly ameliorated by more exact legislation
on the procedures of election and appointment of officers, it still
has importance in view of the increased number of offices in the
public field, especially of commissions and boards. Phases of the
subject considered here are the conditions and elements of de
facto officership, the validity of de facto officers' acts, attacks on
their positions, their liability for their acts, and, the most active
current question, their rights to compensation.
I. WHO IS A DE FACTO OFFICER

The de jure officer is one who is duly qualified and appointed
or elected in compliance with the law governing his position.
Contrastingly, the usurper or intruder merely assumes an office
to exercise its functions without any legal title or color of right
to that office. Between these positions is the individual who is
in possession of an office and discharging its duties under color
of authority derived from some sort of election or appointment,
however irregular or informal, 2 or at least from general reputa1. Police Jury v. Haw, 2 La. 41 (1830).
2. State v. Sadler, 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26 So. 390 (1898) gives a complete
definition after a fairly detailed consideration of policy and jurisprudence.
It says: "An officer de facto is one who exercises the duties of an office under
color of appointment or election to that office, or who has the reputation of
being the officer he assumes to be. He differs from the usurper of an office
who undertakes to act.. . without color of right; and from an officer de jure

who is in all respects legally appointed and qualified to exercise the office."
Other discussions and definitions can be found in

the leading case of

State v. Carrol, 38 Conn. 449, 9 Am. Rep. 409 (1871); De Facto Public Officers,
9 So. Calif. L. Rev. 189 (1936); McQuillan, Municipal Corporations 376, §
12.102 (3 ed. 1949).
[200]
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tion.3 Such a situation has been given legal standing as a matter
of public policy. Public acts, records, contracts and the like, participated in by a public officer who subsequently is found to be
holding office under a nullifying irregularity, cannot be treated
simply as void. It Would place too great a burden on the public
to require them, in their dealings with public officers, to inquire
into their backgrounds for every act. Hence the de facto doctrine.
For one. to attain de facto status, however, there are three
requirements that have been enunciated by the courts. The most
controversial is the insistence by a slight majority that the office
held must exist as a de jure office. The holder must have
attained that office under some color of title, and he must be in
actual physical possession of the office.
Necessity of the De Jure Office
Analogously to the officer, the office itself may be said, for
analytical purposes, to have two aspects-one de jure and the
other de facto.4 The former is related to the legal authority for
the existence of the office; the latter to its existence, in fact, despite
an irregularity in, or complete lack of, legal origin or reason for
continuance. For example, a regularly constituted office may be
abolished, whereupon it loses its legal identity. But if the abolition is not generally recognized, and the office continues to function, it is said by some to exist as a de facto office.
There is seemingly irreconcilable conflict of authority among
the various states over whether it is possible to have a de facto
officer in the absence of a de jure office.5 The leading United States
case of Norton v. Shelby County,6 involving the status of commissioners whose offices were created under an unconstitutional
statute, lays down the rule that such is not possible. Although
the court there admitted the cogent policy reasons underlying
the de facto theory, it followed the reasoning that, since an
unconstitutional law is void ab initio, the office "created" thereby
never existed, and it would be "a misapplication of terms to call
one an 'officer' who holds no office." 7
3. State v. Sadler, 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26 So. 390 (1898); Miller v. Batson,
160 Miss. 642, 134 So. 567 (1931); Nofire v. United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897).
4. Our court has described individuals as both de facto and de jure, but
better terminology keeps them separate. The combination in a single individual of both aspects of course means the normal situation of a legally
elected officer in physical possession of the office. See Monroe v. Liebmann,
47 La. Ann. 155, 16 So. 744 (1895); State v. Hodges, 165 La. 552, 115 So. 747
(1928); Wilson v. Lee, 196 La. 285, 199 So. 117 (1940).
5. Am. Jur., Public Officers, § 475; 99 A.L.R. 294 (1935).
6. 118 U.S. 425 (1886).
7. Id. at 441 et seq.
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While the court relied completely on legal reasoning, the
decision of course amounted to a policy refusal to imply to the
de facto office the same need of recognition as the de facto officer.
That this view creates hardships is well demonstrated by the fact
that some thirty states, although not formulating a definite rule
to the contrary, have found numerous differentiations and exceptions that have allowed de facto status in such a situation.8
Criticism may well begin by pointing out that the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1940 repudiated the view that
declaring a statute unconstitutional rendered it void ab initio.
Referring specifically to the Norton case, it said in Chicot County
DrainageDistrict v. Baxter State Bank:
"It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualification. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to
be considered in various aspects. . . . Questions of rights
claimed to have become vested, of status, or prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the
statute and of its previous application, demand examination.
These questions are among the most difficult of those which
have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and
it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified." 9
As well as removing the legal basis of argument in favor of the
Norton view, this excerpt also points out that policy considerations marshall against requiring the existence of a de jure office
for the existence of a de facto officer. Very harsh situations could
arise where one of the government's many boards or commissions
is declared unconstitutionally set up, or where one has been abolished and yet continues to function through error or misunderstanding. Should all their acts be voided, ab initio, even though
they have been in existence for months or even years? Pertinent
objections can be offered immediately. 0 There seems to be no
8. 99 A.L.R. 294 (1935).,
9. 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1939).

10. Objections may be found more fully developed in De Facto Public
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difference between the policy necessitating validation of the acts
of a de facto officer in a de jure office and one in a de facto office.
An office should be treated as de jure until adjudicated otherwise,
or else everyone who deals with it will have to be a constitutional
or legal expert.
Still, the Louisiana court elected to follow the Norton view.
In Garnier v. Louisiana Milk Commission," the statute creating
the Milk Commission had named, as ex officio member of that
commission, the "Secretary of the Louisiana State Livestock
Board of the Louisiana State University" when no such position
existed at the university. The place on the commission was
assumed by Dr. Flower, the secretary of the Louisiana State Livestock Sanitary Board. Once the court denied him de jure status
on the commission because his title did not properly correspond
to that named by the statute, he urged that he had at least de
facto status. The court interpreted the statute as creating, to
reduce the situation to hypothetical form, "x office as filled by y"
rather than creating "x office" with the legislative mandate that
it be filled by the holder of y office. Then, relying on the Norton
rule, they reasoned that since y did not exist, then "x office as
filled by y" did not exist either, and hence there was no de jure
office that Flower could hold even as de facto officer. While this
is certainly a reasonable interpretation, it seems that the other,
equally reasonable, would have been far preferable because of
the practical results that followed. Accepting the former resulted
in the selection of the undesirable Norton rule.
The counter argument, in favor of requiring a de jure office,
is the demand for some reasonable limit on the validation of any
kind of office, unless we are ready to ignore all constitutional
limitations; and there is, of course, some merit in this. The objections listed above were no doubt to some degree considered by
the Louisiana court, and their decision is apparently 12 made.
Still, the very selection of the more stringent Norton rule may
lead the court to find exceptions.
Officers, 9 So. Calif. L. Rev. 189, 206 (1936). See also Lang v. Bayonne, 74
N.J.L. 455, 68 Atl. 90, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 93, 12 Ann. Cas. 961, 122 Am. St. Rep.
391 (1907).
11. 200 La. 594, 8 So. 2d 611 (1942).
12. Some question may remain inasmuch as the entire de facto policy
question was not presented very thoroughly in counsel's briefs, although it
may have been in oral argument. See especially appellant's brief on behalf
of a rehearing (denied) at pp. 7-11. It is interesting to note that for the
question of the necessity of a de jure office, the Louisiana cases relied upon
by both majority and dissent cite the same common law source book as
only authority (8 A. & E.E. of Law, pp. 771 et seq.).
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Necessity of Color of Title
It is requisite to de facto status that the individual have
achieved his position through some color of authority or title,
that is, by virtue of some appointment or election, however
irregular or informal. 1 This would include the situations where
the officer was elected or appointed when not qualified for the
position, 14 where the election or appointment was defective procedurally or substantively, 15 where the officeholder has not complied with the legal requirements of the office such as filing
bond' 6 or taking oath, 7 where he was properly in office but has
since accepted an incompatible office,' 8 where he has resigned
and no successor has yet been inducted, 19 where a successor has
been appointed*or elected but has not assumed office, 20 where an
officer has "held over" his regular term because no successor has
been qualified (although this would not be true in Louisiana) ,21
and similar situations. 22 Note that in each of the above instances
there was some irregularity, but always additionally some sort of
13. Cf. note 2, supra. See also Commonwealth v. City of Pittsburgh, 339
Pa. 173, 13 A. 2d 24 (1940).
14. Guilbeau v. Cormier, 32 La. Ann. 930 (1880); Williams v. Police Jury
of Concordia, 160 La. 331, 107 So. 126 (1926); State v. Police Jury of Webster
Parish, 120 La. 163, 45 So. 47 (1907); State v. Smith, 153 La. 577, 96 So. 127
(1923).
15. The Mayor and City Council of Monroe v. Hoffmann, 29 La. Ann. 651
(1877); Webb v. Keller, 39 La. Ann. 58 (1887); State v. Mitchell, 153 La. 585,
96 So. 130 (1923); State v. Hodges, 165 La. 552, 558, 115 So. 747, 750 (1928).
16. Monroe v. Liebmann, 47 La. Ann. 155, 16 So. 744 (1895); Davenport v.
Davenport, 116 La. 1009, 41 So. 240 (1906); Succession of Segura, 134 La. 90,
63 So. 640 (1913); State v, Hargis, 179 La. 625, 154 So. 628 (1934).
17. Police Jury v. Haw, 2 La. 41 (1830); The Citizens Bank v. Bry, 3 La.
Ann. 631 (1848); State v. Glaude, 148 La. 353, 86 So. 895 (1921).
18. State v. Sadler, 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26 So. 390 (1898); State v. Moreau,
153 La. 673, 96 So. 527 (1923); State v. Phillips, 164 La. 597, 114 So. 171 (1927).
See also 100 A.L.R. 1187 (1936).
19. State v. Hargis, 179 La. 625, 154 So. 628 (1934).
20. New Orleans Canal and Bkg. Co. v. Tanner, 26 La. Ann. 274 (1874);
State v. Pertsdorf, 33 La. Ann. 1411 (1881).
21. This usually results in de facto status. See State v. Moreau, 153 La.
673, 96 So. 527 (1923); 71 A.L.R. 748 (1931). In Louisiana, however, the Constitution (La. Const. of 1921, Art. XIX, § 6) and the Revised Statutes (La. R.S.
[1950] 42:2) specifically provide that any officeholder shall remain in office
until his successor is qualified or inducted. These sections have been interpreted as creating a duty on the part of a holdover, or even one whose
resignation has been accepted. State v. Webster Parish School Board, 150
So. 446 (La. App. 1933); State v. Hargis, 179 La. 623, 154 So. 688 (1934); 14
A.L.R. 48. Compare with the situations footnoted by notes 19 and 20, supra.
For the question of the duty of a de facto officer to perform his functions,
see material footnoted by note 43, infra. For further language supporting
the view that the holder would be accorded de jure status, see State v. Lancaster, 218 La. 1052, 1066, 51 So. 2d 622, 627 (1951), where the court treats the
holdover and de facto questions separately.
22. Another instance might be afforded by a revolutionary or military
government. State v. MacFarland, 25 La. Ann. 547 (1872); Burke v. Tregre,
22 La. Ann. 629 (1870).
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election or appointment to excuse the belief that the individual
properly occupied office.
Also usually resulting in de facto status is the situation where
an individual holds office under such color of general reputation
as results in general public acquiescence in his authority. 23 This
fits in with the policy theory underlying de facto officership, and
24
has been recognized in Louisiana. In Davenport v. Davenport
one of the reasons given for according de facto status to a notary
was that he had "the reputation of being such in the community
in which he lives." And in State v. Sadler25 the definition of a
de facto officer included one "who has the reputation of being
the officer he assumes to be." In the Gamier case, if the court
had admitted that the statutorily created commission office
existed, then it would not have mattered if the contributing board
office existed or not. Flower's assumption of membership on the
commission, unobjected to by the other members or the public
for a goodly period of time, surely gave him the reputation of
being a member, and one sufficient to accord de facto status.
A further requirement in regard to color of title or reputation is that parties dealing with such officer in order to plead his
de facto status must have relied in good faith on his apparent
title. In one Louisiana case a voter, arriving early at the polls,
impressed two bystanders to receive his ballot. When his vote
was challenged he pleaded that they had de facto status as commissioners. The court denied it, pointing out his knowledge of
26
the infirmity of their appointment.
Necessity of Actual Physical Possession
Actual physical possession of the office is an essential to de
facto officership.27 It usually must be accompanied by good faith,
and faithful exercise of the functions of the office and discharge
of its duties, since possession alone makes one a usurper whose
acts are wholly void.
II. VALIDITY OF AND LIABILITY FOR DE FACTO ACTS
Once it has been determined that an officer has de facto
status, there is no question as to the validity of his acts insofar
23. Note 3, supra.
24. 116 La. 1009, 41 So. 240, 114 Am. St. Rep. 575 (1906).
25. 51 La. Ann. 1397, 26 So. 390 (1898).
26. Lower Terrebonne Ref. and Mfg. Co. v. Police Jury of Parish of Terrebonne, 115 La. 1019, 40 So. 443 (1906).
27. Guillotte v. Poincy, 41 La. Ann. 333, 6 So. 507, 6 L.R.A. 403 (1889);
Jackson v. Powell, 119 La. 883, 44 So. 689 (1907).
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as the public and third parties are concerned, until such time as
his title is adjudged insufficient. This view was expressed in
Louisiana first in 184828 and has been repeated in a long series
of cases. 29 Thus the public is not forced to look behind the election or appointment of every officer with whom they ,deal.30 But
this validation of a de facto's actions does not apply in any situation where his own rights, and not those of the public or third
parties, are concerned. An officer, when attempting to justify
his own actions, must show his de jure status.31 The rationale
most often given for this is the discouragement of the seizure of
public office.
An interesting question arises over the status and powers
of individuals appointed by a de facto officer or body, or by a
body which included a de facto member whose vote or consent
was necessary to the appointment. Cases in other jurisdictions
have obtained two results, some holding that the individual
82
gained de jure status, others that he gained only de facto status,
33
with the latter view seemingly predominating.
In regard to the liability for the acts of de facto officers, the
general rule is that they themselves cannot escape civil or
criminal liability for wrongs committed in office by an assertion of their de facto status. They are subject to contempt proceedings and imprisonment for misbehaviour in office.3 4 A muni28. The Citizen's Bank v. Bry, 3 La. Ann. 631 (1848).
29. The Citizens Bank v. Bry, 3 La. Ann. 631 (1848) (deputy notary);
New Orleans Canal and Banking Co. v. Tanner, 26 La. Ann. 274 (1874) (clerk
of court); Guilbeau v. Cormier, 32 La. Ann. 930 (1880) (judge ad hoc); Webb
v. Keller, 39 La. Ann. 55 (1887) (tutor or administrator); Davenport v. Davenport, 116 La. 1009, 41 So. 240 (1906) (notary); State v. Police Jury of Webster
Parish, 120 La. 163, 45 So. 47 (1907) (deputy clerk); State v. Smith, 153 La.
577, 96 So. 127 (1923) (jury commissioners); Williams v. Police Jury of Concordia Parish, 160 La. 331, 107 So. 126 (1926) (police jury members); State v.
Hodges, 165 La. 552, 115 So. 747 (1928) (school superintendent).
30. Sureties for de facto officers must. This stems from the theory that
the de facto is to be regarded in all respects as a de jure officer. So long as
he is accepted as a public fiduciary, he must be bonded. Therefore sureties
cannot plead his de facto status to avoid payment on his behalf. Police Jury
v. Haw, 2 La. 41 (1830). Most ramifications of this are taken care of in the
surety contract.
31. A party suing, defending or acting in his own right as public officer
must show de jure status. See cases collected in Am. Jur., Public Officers,
1 493. See also material footnoted by note 43, infra.
32. 106 A.L.R. 1324 (1937).
33. State v. Board of Education of Mason County, 35 S.E. 2d 850 (W. Va.
1945).
34. 64 A.L.R. 534 (1929). Cf. material footnoted by note 31, supra, and
note 43, infra. Brandon v. State, 233 Ala. 20, 173 So. 251 (1936); 64 A.L.R. 541
(1929); People v. Madel, 337 Ill. 169, 168 N.E. 883 (1929); Commonwealth v.
Avery, 301 Mass. 605, 18 N.E. 2d 353 (1938).
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cipality has been held free from liability in the tort of a de facto
35
officer in two jurisdictions.

III.

ATTACKS ON THEIR POSITION

The procedures used to settle disputes over office titles vary
among the several states. 'In Louisiana the legislature has afforded
the "intrusion into office suit" which allows the state or the person demanding possession of the office to proceed against one
who "usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises or
attempts to remain in possession of any public office . .. in this
state." 36
Often, however, it is the particular act of an officer that is
under attack, and one of the methods used is to question the
rights of that officer to his position. Injunction, particularly,
has been sought to restrain the activities of an officer allegedly
holding under defective title. A long line of cases has held that
such plaintiff must resort to the direct action of the intrusion
into office suit, and collateral attacks are denied.37 An injunction,
however, will be allowed the de facto officer whose possession is
being interfered with, provided he can show that he has some
claim to the office in question. The most recent case on the subject, Guillory v. Jones,38 has summarized and discussed the previous jurisprudence. There the couit continued on to say that, if
such injunction is obtained by the person in possession, then the
judge can try the rights of both parties to the office. Noting that
Louisiana judges are empowered to administer both law and
equity in the same proceeding, they concluded: "There is no
reason why a contest like this in a Louisiana court should not be
settled finally in the suit for an injunction, instead of requiring
two suits to settle the controversy."
Where the attack is made directly under the provisions of
35. Rounds v. Bangor, 46 Me. 541, 74 Am. Dec. 469 (1859); Clark v. Easton,
146 Mass. 43, 14 N.E. 795 (1888).
36. La. R.S. (1950) 42:76 et seq. The writ of quo warranto is no longer
available for ousting one from public office, having been superseded by La.

Rev. Stat. of 1870, §§ 2593-2605, as amended by La. Act 102 of 1928.
37. State v. Ferray, 22 La. Ann. 423 (1870) (sheriff); New Orleans Canal
and Banking Co. v. Tanner, 26 La. Ann. 274 (1874)

(clerk of court); Mayor

and City Council of Natchitoches v. Redmond, 28 La. Ann. 274 (1876) (mayor
and city council); State v. Sadler, 51 La. Ann. 1347, 26 So. 340 (1899)

(judge);

State v. Police Jury of Webster Parish, 120 La. 163, 45 So. 47 (1907) (deputy
clerk); State v. Smith, 153 La. 577, 96 So. 127 (1923) (jury commissioners);
Williams v. Police Jury of Concordia Parish, 160 La. 331, 107 So. 126 (1926)
(police jurors).
38. 197 La. 165, 1 So. 2d 75 (1941).
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the intrusion into office statute, the procedure is well settled. 9
While it can be initiated by the office claimant or the state, it is
usually brought by the state on relation of the claimant. The
question then becomes: "Has the relator a muniment of title to
the office held by the defendant?" 40 If he has one that establishes a prima facie right to the office (for example, a commission
from the governor, a judgment of court, official election returns
published), the next inquiry is into the right of tenure of the
defendant; but if the relator has no such muniment, and the state
does not further the investigation on its own behalf, the proceedings are dismissed. If the muniment is possessed by the relator,
and the defendant counters with a showing of his right to remain
in office, the latter can then, and only then, inquire into the
legality of the title relied upon by the relator-even if it is a
commission from the governor. 41 Mere de facto status, however,
does not constitute such a right as will allow one in possession of
an office to combat a prima facie complete muniment of title. In
State v. Lancaster42 where the defendant Lancaster's election as
mayor had been declared null in a previous suit, he refused to
give up the office to the claimant, contending that the latter's
claim, although supported by a commission from the governor,
was the result of another void election. The court denied Lancaster de facto status, but said that even if he had such it would
not be sufficient basis for him to combat the claimant's prima
facie valid title.
Care should be taken, in general, not to rely completely on
the provisions of the intrusion into office statute to the exclusion
of the de facto relationships and rights that may arise.
Another aspect of this phase is worthy of mention. A defense
that might be offered by a de facto officer to attacks on his
actions is that he not only has the right, but the duty to fulfill the
4
obligations of his office. a

IV.

THEIR RIGHTS TO COMPENSATION

The governing body in Louisiana has a right to pay a de
facto officer the salary that goes with the office. 44 Once it has
39. State v. Lancaster, 218 La. 1052, 51 So. 2d 622 (1951); Ford v. Miltenberger, 33 La. Ann. 263 (1881); State v. Cage, 196 La. 341, 199 So. 209 (1940).
40. Ford v. Miltenberger, 33 La. Ann. 263 (1881).
41. State v. Cage, 196 La. 341, 199 So. 209 (1940).
42. 218 La. 1052, 51 So. 2d 622 (1951).
43. State v. Hodges, 165 La. 552, 556, 115 So. 747, 749 (1928); Wilson v. Lee,
196 La. 271, 283, 199 So. 117, 121 (1940).
44. Michel v. City of New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 1094, 1097 (1880): "Sound

1952]

COMMENTS

been paid, two parties might try to recover it-the same governing body or the de jure officer. In most jurisdictions the former
cannot recover a paid salary, but the latter can.45 In Louisiana
the emphasis is not on the identity of the claimant, but the good
or bad faith of the officer who is being dispossessed. Under the
terms of the intrusion into office statute either the state or the
office claimant must prove bad faith in order to regain paid
emoluments. 46 This, of course, would apply to de facto holders
as well as usurpers. Should the de facto officer yield voluntarily
to the de jure, without suit having been brought, it might best
be argued that the intrusion into office statute sets out a state
policy of allowing recovery by the de jure only upon proof of
bad faith. In any event, the de jure officer cannot proceed against
the local government for salary 47already paid a de facto, but must
go against the de facto himself.
Where a de facto has not yet been paid, and where his rights
to demand salary are not covered by statute, the majority rule
among the various states is that he is denied recovery. The
rationale most used to support this view is that the right to compensation is an incident to the title of the office rather than the
functions of occupation and exercise thereof. This rule, or a variation of it, has been followed in some thirty states. 48 The policy,
of course, is the discouragement of the seizure of office. A smaller
number of jurisdictions hold that he can recover provided there
is no de jure claimant, and a few have held that he can recover
for services performed in good faith even though there is a de
jure claimant. 49 However, attempts to recover in quantum meruit
have been finding support in recent decisions.50 Louisiana's intrusion into office statute, requiring proof of bad faith for the recovery of salary already paid, indicates approval of a liberal policy.
This is bolstered by such cases as State v. Hodges and Wilson v.
Lee 5' which state that the de facto has the duty of fulfilling the
public policy dictates the wisdom and the necessity of paying the salary of
the officer in possession of the office and performing functions required for

the protection of society and the maintenance of peace and order.
45. 93 A.L.R. 258 (1934), 151 A.L.R. 948 (1944).
46. La. R.S. (1950) 42:80. State v. Irion, 169 La. 481, 125 So. 567 (1929);

State v. Lancaster, 218 La. 1052, 51 So. 2d 622 (1951).
one of
47.
Police
48.
49.
50.

See this latter case for

the few indications of what might constitute bad faith.
Michel v. City of New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 1094 (1880); McCollister v.
Jury of Sabine Parish, 197 So. 303 (La. App. 1940).
93 A.L.R. 258, 260 et seq. (1934), 151 A.L.R. 948, 954 (1944).
93 A.L.R. 258, 266 (1934), 151 A.L.R. 948, 956-7 (1944).
93 A.L.R. 258, 272 (1934), 151 A.L.R. 948, 958 (1944).

51. See note 43, supra.
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functions of his office. It would seem that Louisiana would'follow
the rule that a de facto officer can recover for services performed
in good faith even though there is a de jure claimant.
Henry J. Dauterive, Jr.

Jurisdiction Ratione Materiae et Personae
in Louisiana
Throughout Louisiana's judicial history no little trouble has
been experienced by the supreme court in determining the meaning and proper application of the terms jurisdiction ratione
materiae and jurisdiction ratione personae. An attempt to derive
a logical pattern from the cases on the subject would probably
prove futile indeed. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to
try to educe the meaning of the terms as they were understood
at the time of the adoption of the Code of Practice of 1825; on
the basis of these findings a discussion is proposed of several
recent cases in which the writer believes the supreme court has
deviated to some degree from the traditional concepts.
Most of the pertinent articles of the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1870 are vague.' Article 87 is probably the most satisfactory, in providing that:
"In order to ascertain whether a judge be competent or not,
three points must be taken into consideration:
(1)

The object or the amount in dispute.

(2)

The person of the defendant.

(3)

The place where the action is to be brought."

The first of these points undeniably refers to jurisdiction ratione
materiae. The meanings to be ascribed to the latter two might
give rise to some disagreement, but it is submitted that both have
reference to jurisdiction ratione personae. Article 892 would seem
to bear out this interpretation, by speaking in terms of the "person of the defendant" in stating the general rule of "where the
action is to be brought," namely, at the domicile of the defendant.
1. See Arts. 75, 76, 86, La. Code of Practice of 1870.
2. "To determine his competency, as relates to the person of the defendant,
the rule which requires that the defendant be sued at the place of his domicile or usual residence must be observed. This rule is subject, however, to
various exceptions, determined in the chapter which treats of judicial
demands and of citations."

